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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to integrate the notions of stochastic conditional
independence and variation conditional independence under a more general no-
tion of extended conditional independence. We show that under appropriate
assumptions the calculus that applies for the two cases separately (axioms of a
separoid) still applies for the extended case. These results provide a rigorous ba-
sis for a wide range of statistical concepts, including ancillarity and sufficiency,
and, in particular, the Decision Theoretic framework for statistical causality,
which uses the language and calculus of conditional independence in order to
express causal properties and make causal inferences.
1 Introduction
Conditional independence is a concept that has been widely studied and used in Prob-
ability and Statistics. The idea of treating conditional independence as an abstract
concept with its own calculus was introduced by Dawid [1979a], who showed that many
results and theorems concerning statistical concepts such as ancillarity, sufficiency,
causality etc., are just applications of general properties of conditional independence—
extended to encompass stochastic and non-stochastic variables together. Properties
of conditional independence have also been investigated by Spohn [1994] in con-
nection with causality, and Pearl and Paz [1986], Pearl [2000], Geiger et al. [1990],
Lauritzen et al. [1990] in connection with graphical models.
In this paper, we consider two separate concepts of conditional independence:
stochastic conditional independence, which involves solely stochastic variables, and
variation conditional independence, which involves solely non-stochastic variables. We
argue that, although these concepts are fundamentally different in terms of their math-
ematical definitions, they share a common intuitive understanding as “irrelevance” re-
lations. This allows them to satisfy the same set of rules (axioms of a separoid [Dawid,
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2001a]). Armed with this insight, we unify the two notions into the more general con-
cept of extended conditional independence, and show that (under suitable technical
conditions) extended conditional independence also satisfies the axioms of a separoid.
To motivate the need for such a theory we recall some fundamental concepts
of statistics. First, consider the concept of ancillarity [Fisher, 1925]. Let X :=
(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) be a random sample from a probability distribution with unknown
parameter θ, and let T = T (X) be a statistic. T is called an ancillary statistic
for θ if its distribution does not depend on the value of θ [Basu, 1964]. For ex-
ample, consider an independent and identically distributed sample (X1, X2, . . . , Xn)
from the normal N (θ, 1) distribution. Then the range T := max{X1, X2, . . . , Xn} −
min{X1, X2, . . . , Xn} is an ancillary statistic, because its distribution does not change
as θ changes. Ancillary statistics can be used to recover information lost by reducing
the data to the maximum likelihood estimate [Ghosh et al., 2010]. For our purposes,
we remark that the definition of ancillarity can be understood intuitively as requiring
the independence of the stochastic variable T from the non-stochastic variable θ. We
can express this property using the now standard (conditional) independence notation
of Dawid [1979a]: T ⊥⊥ θ.
Another example is the notion of sufficiency [Fisher, 1925]. With notation as
above, T is a sufficient statistic for θ if the conditional distribution of the full data X,
given the value of T (X), does not depend on the value of the parameter θ [Casella and Berger,
2001, p. 272]. For example, consider an independent and identically distributed sample
X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) from the Poisson distribution with mean θ. Then the sample
total T = X1 +X2 + . . . + Xn is a sufficient statistic for θ, since the distribution of
X, given T = t, is multinomial M(t; 1/n, . . . , 1/n) for all θ. Here we emphasize that
sufficiency can be expressed intuitively as: “Given T , X is independent of θ”, where
X and T are stochastic variables and θ is a non-stochastic variable. Using conditional
independence notation: X ⊥⊥ θ | T .
A further application of these ideas emerges from the area of causality: in partic-
ular, the Decision Theoretic framework of statistical causality [Dawid, 2015]. In this
framework, the language and calculus of conditional independence are fundamental
for expressing and manipulating causal concepts. The Decision Theoretic framework
differentiates between observational and interventional regimes, using a non-stochastic
variable to index the regimes. Typically, we consider the regime under which data
can be collected (the observational regime) and a number of interventional regimes
that we wish to compare. Since we mostly have access to purely observational data,
we focus on extracting information from the observational regime relevant to the in-
terventional regimes. Then the conditions that would justify transfer of information
across regimes can be expressed in the language of conditional independence. To il-
lustrate this, suppose we are interested in assessing the effect of a binary treatment
variable T on a disease outcome variable Y (e.g., recovery). Denote
T =
{
0, for control treatment
1, for active treatment.
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We consider three regimes, indexed by a non-stochastic variable Σ:
Σ =


∅ denotes the observational regime
0 denotes the interventional regime under control treatment
1 denotes the interventional regime under active treatment.
In the simplest case, we might entertain the following (typically unrealistic!) prop-
erty: for either treatment choice T = 0, 1, the conditional distribution of the disease
variable Y , given the treatment variable T , is the same in the observational and the
corresponding interventional regime. We can express this property, using conditional
independence notation, as Y ⊥⊥ Σ | T . Such a property, when it can be taken as
valid, would allow us to use the observational regime to make causal inference directly.
However, in most cases this assumption will not be easy to defend. Consequently we
would like to explore alternative, more justifiable, conditions, which would allow us
to make causal inference. For such exploration a calculus of extended conditional
independence becomes a necessity.
The layout of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give the definition of a
separoid, an algebraic structure with five axioms, and show that stochastic condi-
tional independence and variation conditional independence satisfy these axioms. In
Section 3 we rigorously define extended conditional independence, a combined form
of stochastic and variation conditional independence, and explore conditions under
which extended conditional independence satisfies the separoid axioms, for the most
part restricting to cases where the left-most term in an extended conditional indepen-
dence relation is purely stochastic. In Section 4 we take a Bayesian approach, which
allows us to deduce the axioms when the regime space is discrete. Next, using a more
direct measure-theoretic approach, we show in Section 5 that the axioms hold when
all the stochastic variables are discrete, and likewise in the presence of a dominating
regime. In Section 6 we introduce a slight weakening of extended conditional inde-
pendence, for which the axioms apply without further conditions. Next, Section 7
attempts to extend the analysis to cases where non-stochastic variables appear in the
left-most term. Our analysis is put to use in Section 8, which gives some examples
of its applications in causal inference, illustrating how extended conditional indepen-
dence, equipped with its separoid calculus, provides a powerful tool in the area. We
conclude in Section 9 with some comments on the usefulness of combining the theory
of extended conditional independence with the technology of graphical models.
2 Separoids
In this Section we describe the algebraic structure called a separoid [Dawid, 2001a]:
a three-place relation on a join semilattice, subject to five axioms.
Let V be a set with elements denoted by x, y, . . . , and ≤ a quasiorder (a reflexive
and transitive binary relation) on V . For x, y ∈ V , if x ≤ y and y ≤ x, we say that x
and y are equivalent and write x ≈ y. For a subset A ⊆ V , z is a join of A if a ≤ z
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for all a ∈ A, and it is a minimal element of V with that property; we write z =
∨
A;
similarly, z is a meet of A (z =
∧
A) if z ≤ a for all a ∈ A, and it is a maximal
element of V with that property. We write x ∨ y for
∨
{x, y}, and x ∧ y for
∧
{x, y}.
Clearly if z and w are both joins (respectively meets) of A, then z ≈ w. We
call (V,≤) (or, when ≤ is understood, just V ) a join semilattice if there exists a join
for any nonempty finite subset; similarly, (V,≤) is a meet semilattice if there exists a
meet for any nonempty finite subset. When (V,≤) is both a meet and join semilattice,
it is a lattice.
Definition 2.1 (Separoid). Given a ternary relation · ⊥⊥ · | · on V , we call ⊥⊥ a
separoid (on (V,≤)), or the triple (V,≤, ⊥⊥) a separoid, if:
S1: (V,≤) is a join semilattice
and
P1: x ⊥⊥ y | z ⇒ y ⊥⊥ x | z
P2: x ⊥⊥ y | y
P3: x ⊥⊥ y | z and w ≤ y ⇒ x ⊥⊥ w | z
P4: x ⊥⊥ y | z and w ≤ y ⇒ x ⊥⊥ y | (z ∨ w)
P5: x ⊥⊥ y | z and x ⊥⊥ w | (y ∨ z) ⇒ x ⊥⊥ (y ∨ w) | z
The following Lemma shows that, in P4 and P5, the choice of join does not change
the property.
Lemma 2.1. Let (V,≤, ⊥⊥) be a separoid and xi, yi, zi ∈ V (i = 1, 2) with x1 ≈ x2,
y1 ≈ y2 and z1 ≈ z2. If x1 ⊥⊥ y1 | z1 then x2 ⊥⊥ y2 | z2.
Proof. See Corollary 1.2 in Dawid [2001a].
Definition 2.2 (Strong separoid). We say that the triple (V,≤, ⊥⊥) is a strong sep-
aroid if we strengthen S1 in Definition 2.1 to
S1′: (V,≤) is a lattice
and in addition to P1–P5 we require
P6: if z ≤ y and w ≤ y, then x ⊥⊥ y | z and x ⊥⊥ y | w ⇒ x ⊥⊥ y | (z ∧ w).
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2.1 Stochastic conditional independence as a separoid
The concept of stochastic conditional independence is a familiar example of a separoid
(though not, without further conditions, a strong separoid [Dawid, 1979b]).
Let (Ω,A), (F,F) be measure spaces, and Y : Ω → F a random variable. We
denote by σ(Y ) the σ-algebra generated by Y , i.e. {Y −1(C) : C ∈ F}. We write
Y : (Ω,A)→ (F,F) to imply that Y is measurable with respect to the σ-algebras A
and F ; equivalently, σ(Y ) ⊆ A.
Lemma 2.2. Let Y : (Ω, σ(Y )) → (FY ,FY ) and Z : (Ω, σ(Z)) → (FZ ,FZ) be
surjective random variables. Suppose that FY contains all singleton sets {y}. Then
the following are equivalent:
(i) σ(Y ) ⊆ σ(Z).
(ii) There exists measurable f : (FZ ,FZ)→ (FY ,FY ) such that Y = f(Z).
Proof. See Appendix A.
In the sequel, whenever we invoke Lemma 2.2 we shall implicitly assume that its
conditions are satisfied. In most of our applications of Lemma 2.2, both (FY ,FY ) and
(FZ ,FZ) will be the real or extended real line equipped with its Borel σ-algebra B.
We recall Kolmogorov’s definition of conditional expectation [Billingsley, 1995,
p. 445]:
Definition 2.3 (Conditional Expectation). Let X be an integrable real-valued ran-
dom variable defined on a probability space (Ω,A,P) and let G ⊆ A be a σ-algebra.
A random variable Y is called (a version of) the conditional expectation of X given
G, and we write Y = E(X | G), if
(i) Y is G-measurable; and
(ii) Y is integrable and E(X1A) = E(Y 1A) for all A ∈ G.
When G = σ(Z) we may write E(X | Z) for E(X | G).
It can be shown that E(X | G) exists, and any two versions of it are almost
surely equal. In particular, if X is G-measurable then E(X | G) = X a.s. Thus for
any integrable function f(X), E{f(X) | X} = f(X) a.s. Also by (ii) for A = Ω,
E(X) = E{E(X | G)}. We will use this in the form E(X) = E{E(X | Y )}.
Definition 2.4 (Conditional Independence). Let X, Y, Z be random variables on
(Ω,A,P). We say that X is (conditionally) independent of Y given Z (with respect
to P), and write X ⊥⊥s Y | Z [P], or just X ⊥⊥s Y | Z when P is understood, if:
For all AX ∈ σ(X), E (1AX | Y, Z) = E (1AX | Z) a.s. [P].
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We refer to the above property as stochastic conditional independence; we use the
subscript s under ⊥⊥ (⊥⊥s) to emphasize that we refer to this stochastic definition.
To prove the axioms, we need equivalent forms of the above definition.
Proposition 2.3. Let X, Y, Z be random variables on (Ω,A,P). Then the following
are equivalent.
(i) X ⊥⊥s Y | Z.
(ii) For all real, bounded and measurable functions f(X), E{f(X) | Y, Z}= E{f(X) |
Z} a.s.
(iii) For all real, bounded and measurable functions f(X), g(Y ), E{f(X)g(Y ) | Z}=
E{f(X) | Z}E{g(Y ) | Z} a.s.
(iv) For all AX ∈ σ(X) and all AY ∈ σ(Y ), E(1AX∩AY | Z) = E(1AX | Z)E(1AY |
Z) a.s.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Henceforth we write X  Y when X = f(Y ) for some measurable function f .
Theorem 2.4. (Axioms of Conditional Independence.) Let X, Y, Z,W be random
variables on (Ω,A,P). Then the following properties hold (the descriptive terms are
those assigned by Pearl [1988]):
P1s. [Symmetry] X ⊥⊥s Y | Z ⇒ Y ⊥⊥s X | Z.
P2s. X ⊥⊥s Y | Y .
P3s. [Decomposition] X ⊥⊥s Y | Z and W  Y ⇒ X ⊥⊥s W | Z.
P4s. [Weak Union] X ⊥⊥s Y | Z and W  Y ⇒ X ⊥⊥s Y | (W,Z).
P5s. [Contraction] X ⊥⊥s Y | Z and X ⊥⊥s W | (Y, Z) ⇒ X ⊥⊥s (Y,W ) | Z.
Proof.
P1s. Follows directly from Proposition 2.3 (iv).
P2s. Let f(X), g(Y ) be real, bounded and measurable functions. Then
E {f(X)g(Y ) | Y } = g(Y )E {f(X) | Y } a.s.
= E {f(X) | Y }E {g(Y ) | Y } a.s.
which proves P2s.
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P3s. Let f(X) be a real, bounded and measurable function. Since W  Y , it follows
from Lemma 2.2 that σ(W ) ⊆ σ(Y ) and thus σ(W,Z) ⊆ σ(Y, Z). Then
E {f(X) |W,Z} = E [E {f(X) | Y, Z} |W,Z] a.s.
= E [E {f(X) | Z} |W,Z] a.s. since X ⊥⊥s Y | Z
= E {f(X) | Z} a.s.
which proves P3s.
P4s. Let f(X) be a real, bounded and measurable function. Since W  Y , it follows
from Lemma 2.2 that σ(W ) ⊆ σ(Y ) and thus σ(Y,W,Z) = σ(Y, Z). Then
E {f(X) | Y,W,Z} = E {f(X) | Y, Z} a.s.
= E {f(X) | Z} a.s. since X ⊥⊥s Y | Z
= E {f(X) |W,Z} a.s. by P3s
which proves P4s.
P5s. Let f(X) be a real, bounded and measurable function. Then
E {f(X) | Y,W,Z} = E {f(X) | Y, Z} a.s. since X ⊥⊥s W | (Y, Z)
= E {f(X) | Z} a.s. since X ⊥⊥s Y | Z
which proves P5s.
In Theorem 2.4 we have shown that stochastic conditional independence satisfies
the axioms of a separoid. Denoting by V the set of all random variables defined on the
probability space (Ω,A,P) and equipping V with the quasiorder , (V,) becomes a
join semilattice and the triple (V,, ⊥⊥) is then a separoid.
Using stochastic conditional independence in an axiomatic way, we can mechani-
cally prove many useful conditional independence results.
Example 2.1. Let X, Y, Z be random variables on (Ω,A,P). Then X ⊥⊥s Y | Z
implies that (X,Z) ⊥⊥s Y | Z. ✷
Proof. Applying P1s to X ⊥⊥s Y | Z, we obtain
Y ⊥⊥s X | Z (2.1)
By P2s, we obtain
Y ⊥⊥s (X,Z) | (X,Z). (2.2)
Applying P3s to (2.2), we obtain
Y ⊥⊥s Z | (X,Z) (2.3)
and applying P5s to (2.1) and (2.3), we obtain
Y ⊥⊥s (X,Z) | Z. (2.4)
The result follows by applying P1s to (2.4).
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Example 2.2. [Nearest Neighbour Property of a Markov Chain]
Let X1, X2, X3, X4, X5 be random variables on (Ω,A,P) and suppose that
(i) X3 ⊥⊥s X1 | X2,
(ii) X4 ⊥⊥s (X1, X2) | X3,
(iii) X5 ⊥⊥s (X1, X2, X3) | X4.
Then X3 ⊥⊥s (X1, X5) | (X2, X4). ✷
Proof. See Dawid [1979a]
2.2 Variation conditional independence as a separoid
Variation conditional independence, which concerns solely non-stochastic variables, is
another, indeed much simpler, example of a separoid.
Let S be a set with elements denoted by e.g. σ, and let V be the set of all functions
with domain S and arbitrary range space. The elements of V will be denoted by
e.g. X, Y, . . .. We do not require any additional properties or structure such as a
probability measure, measurability, etc. We write X  Y to denote that X is a
function of Y , i.e. Y (σ1) = Y (σ2)⇒ X(σ1) = X(σ2). The equivalence classes for this
quasiorder correspond to partitions of S. Then (V,) forms a join semilattice, with
join X ∨ Y the function (X, Y ) ∈ V .
The (unconditional) image of Y is R(Y ) := Y (S) = {Y (σ) : σ ∈ S}. The
conditional image of X, given Y = y is R(X | Y = y) := {X(σ) : σ ∈ S, Y (σ) = y}.
For simplicity of notation we will sometimes write R(X | y) instead of R(X | Y = y),
and R(X | Y ) for the function R(X | Y = .).
Definition 2.5. We say that X is variation (conditionally) independent of Y given
Z (on Ω) and write X ⊥⊥v Y | Z [S] (or, if S is understood, just X ⊥⊥v Y | Z) if:
for any (y, z) ∈ R(Y, Z), R(X | y, z) = R(X | z).
We use the subscript v under ⊥⊥ (⊥⊥v) to emphasize that we refer to the above
non-stochastic definition. In parallel with the stochastic case, we have equivalent
forms of the above definition.
Proposition 2.5. The following are equivalent.
(i) X ⊥⊥v Y | Z.
(ii) The function R(X | Y, Z) of (Y, Z) is a function of Z alone.
(iii) For any z ∈ R(Z), R(X, Y | z) = R(X | z)×R(Y | z).
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2.6. The following are equivalent.
(i) W  Y .
(ii) there exists f : R(Y )→ R(W ) such that W = f(Y ).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 2.7. (Axioms of variation independence.) Let X, Y, Z,W be functions on
S. Then the following properties hold.
P1v. X ⊥⊥v Y | Z ⇒ Y ⊥⊥v X | Z.
P2v. X ⊥⊥v Y | Y .
P3v. X ⊥⊥v Y | Z and W  Y ⇒ X ⊥⊥v W | Z.
P4v. X ⊥⊥v Y | Z and W  Y ⇒ X ⊥⊥v Y | (W,Z).
P5v. X ⊥⊥v Y | Z and X ⊥⊥v W | (Y, Z) ⇒ X ⊥⊥v Y | (W,Z).
Proof.
P1v. Follows directly from Proposition 2.5.
P2v. Let x ∈ R(X). Then
R(X, Y | y) := {(X(σ), Y (σ)) : σ ∈ S, Y (σ) = y}
= {(X(σ), y) : σ ∈ S, Y (σ) = y}
= R(X | y)× {y}
= R(X | y)× R(Y | y)
which proves P2v.
P3v. LetX ⊥⊥v Y | Z andW  Y . SinceW  Y , it follows from Proposition 2.6 that
there exists f : Y (S)→ W (S) such that W (σ) = f(Y (σ)). For any (w, z) ∈ R(W,Z),
R(X | w, z) = {X(σ) : σ ∈ S, (W,Z)(σ) = (w, z)}
= {X(σ) : σ ∈ S, f(Y (σ)) = w,Z(σ) = z}
= {X(σ) : σ ∈ S, Y (σ) ∈ f−1(w), Z(σ) = z}
=
⋃
y∈f−1(w)
{X(σ) : σ ∈ S, Y (σ) = y, Z(σ) = z}
=
⋃
y∈f−1(w)
R(X | y, z)
=
⋃
y∈f−1(w)
R(X | z) since X ⊥⊥v Y | Z
= R(X | z)
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which proves P3v.
P4v. Let X ⊥⊥v Y | Z and W  Y . Since W  Y , it follows from Proposition 2.6
that there exists f : Y (S) → W (S) such that W (σ) = f(Y (σ)). Now let (y, z, w) ∈
R(Y, Z,W ). Then f(y) = w and we have that:
R(X | y, z, w) := {X(σ) : σ ∈ S, (Y, Z,W )(σ) = (y, z, w)}
= {X(σ) : σ ∈ S, Y (σ) = y, Z(σ) = z, f(Y (σ)) = w}
= {X(σ) : σ ∈ S, Y (σ) = y, Z(σ) = z} since Y (σ) = y ⇒ f(Y (σ)) = w
= R(X | y, z)
= R(X | z) since X ⊥⊥v Y | Z.
Now P4v follows from Proposition 2.5(ii).
P5v. Let X ⊥⊥v Y | Z and X ⊥⊥v W | (Y, Z). Also let (y, w, z) ∈ R(Y,W,Z). Then
R(X | y, w, z) = R(X | y, z) since X ⊥⊥v W | (Y, Z)
= R(X | z) since X ⊥⊥v Y | Z
which proves P5v.
In the above theorem we have shown that variation independence satisfies the ax-
ioms of a separoid. Indeed—and in contrast with stochastic conditional independence—
variation independence also satisfies the axioms of a strong separoid [Dawid, 2001b].
3 Extended conditional independence
There is a basic intuitive similarity between the notions of stochastic conditional in-
dependence and variation independence. A statement like X ⊥⊥s Y | Z for stochas-
tic variables, or X ⊥⊥v Y | Z for non-stochastic variables, reflects our informal un-
derstanding that, having already obtained information about Z, further information
about Y will not affect the uncertainty (suitably understood) about X . Building on
this intuitive interpretation, one can extend X ⊥⊥s Y | Z to the case that one or both
of Y and Z involve non-stochastic variables, such as parameters or regime indicators.
Such an extended version of conditional independence would embrace the notions of
ancillarity, sufficiency, causality, etc.
The first authors to consider sufficiency in a general abstract setting were Halmos and Savage
[1949]. Removing any assumption such as the existence of a probability mass function
or a density with respect to a common measure, sufficiency is defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Sufficiency). Consider a a random variableX , and a family P = {Pθ}
of probability distributions forX , indexed by θ ∈ Θ. A statistic T = T (X) is sufficient
for P, or for θ, if for any real, bounded and measurable function h, there exists a
function w(T ) such that, for any θ ∈ Θ,
Eθ{h(X) | T} = w(T ) a.s. [Pθ].
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Interpreting the definition carefully, we require that, for any real, bounded and
measurable h(X), there exist a single function w(T ) that serves as a version of the
conditional expectation Eθ{h(X) | T} under Pθ, simultaneously for all θ ∈ Θ.
In the Decision Theoretic framework we consider, instead of the parameter space
Θ, a space S of different regimes, typically σ,1 under which data can be observed. We
thus consider a family P = {Pσ : σ ∈ S} of probability measures over a suitable space
(Ω,A). A stochastic variable, such as X : (Ω, σ(X)) → (R,B), can have different
distributions under the different regimes σ ∈ S. We write Eσ(X | Y ) to denote
a version of the conditional expectation E(X | Y ) under regime σ: this is defined
a.s. [Pσ]. We also consider non-stochastic variables, functions defined on S, which we
term decision variables. Decision variables give us full or partial information about
which regime is operating. We denote by Σ the identity function on S.
We aim to extend Definition 3.1 to express a statement like X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ),
where X, Y, Z are stochastic variables and Θ,Φ decision variables. In order to for-
malise such a statement, we first describe what we would like a conditional indepen-
dence statement like X ⊥⊥ Θ | Φ to reflect intuitively: that the distribution of X ,
given the information carried by (Θ,Φ) about which regime is operating, is in fact
fully determined by the value of Φ alone.
However, in order for this to make sense, we must assume that Φ and Θ together
do fully determine the regime σ ∈ S operating and, thus, the distribution of X in this
regime. Formally, we require that the function (Φ,Θ) defined on S be a surjection. In
this case we say that Φ and Θ are complementary (on S), or that Θ is complementary
to Φ (on S). This leads to the following definition.
Definition 3.2. Let X , Y and Z be stochastic variables, and let Φ and Θ be
complementary decision variables. We say that X is (conditionally) independent of
(Y,Θ) given (Z,Φ) and write X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) if, for all φ ∈ Φ(S) and all real,
bounded and measurable functions h, there exists a function wφ(Z) such that, for all
σ ∈ Φ−1(φ),
Eσ{h(X) | Y, Z} = wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]. (3.1)
We will refer to this definition of conditional independence as extended conditional
independence. Note that the only important property of Θ in the above definition is
that it is complementary to Φ; beyond this, the actual form of Θ becomes irrelevant.
Henceforth, we will write down a conditional independence statement involving two
decision variables only when the two variables are complementary.
Remark 3.1. Assume thatX ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) and consider wφ(Z) as in Definition 3.2.
Then
Eσ {h(X) | Z} = Eσ [Eσ {h(X) | Y, Z} | Z] a.s. Pσ
= Eσ {wφ(Z) | Z} a.s. Pσ
= wφ(Z) a.s. Pσ.
1The regime indicator σ is not to be confused with the σ-algebra generated by X , denoted by
σ(X).
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Thus wφ(Z) also serves as a version of Eσ{h(X) | Z} for all σ ∈ Φ
−1(φ).
The following example shows that, even when (3.1) holds, we can not use just
any version of the conditional expectation in one regime to serve as a version of
the conditional expectation in another regime. This is because two versions of the
conditional expectation can differ on a set of probability zero, but a set of probability
zero in one regime could have positive probability in another.
Example 3.1. Let the regime space be S = {σ0, σ1}, let binary variable T repre-
sent the treatment taken (where T = 0 denotes placebo and T = 1 denotes active
treatment), and let X be an outcome of interest. Regime σt (t = 0, 1) represents the
interventional regime under treatment t: in particular, Pσj (T = j) = 1.
We consider the situation where the treatment is ineffective, so that X has the
same distribution in both regimes. We then have X ⊥⊥ Σ | T — since, for any func-
tion h(X), we can take as E{h(X) | σ, T}, for both σ = 0 and σ = 1, the (constant)
common expectation of h(X) in both regimes.2
In particular, suppose X has expectation 1 in both regimes. Then the function
w(T ) ≡ 1 is a version both of E{h(X) | σ0, T} and of E{h(X) | σ1, T}. That is,
Eσ0(X | T ) = 1 a.s. [Pσ0 ], and Eσ1(X | T ) = 1 a.s. [Pσ1 ].
Now consider the functions
k0(t) = 1− t and k1(t) = t.
We can see that k0(T ) = w(T ) a.s. [Pσ0 ], so that k0(T ) is a version of E{h(X) |
σ0, T}; similarly, k1(T ) is a version of E{h(X) | σ1, T}. However, almost surely, under
both Pσ0 and Pσ1 , k0(T ) 6= k1(T ). Hence neither of these variables can replace w(T )
in supplying a version of Eσ(X | T ) simultaneously in both regimes. ✷
We now introduce some equivalent versions of Definition 3.2.
Proposition 3.1. Let X, Y, Z be stochastic variables and let Φ,Θ be decision vari-
ables. Then the following are equivalent.
(i) X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ).
(ii) For all φ ∈ Φ(S) and all real, bounded and measurable function h1, there
exists a function wφ(Z) such that, for all σ ∈ Φ−1(φ) and all real, bounded and
measurable functions h2,
Eσ {h1(X)h2(Y ) | Z} = wφ(Z)Eσ {h2(Y ) | Z} a.s. [Pσ].
2Indeed, this encapsulates the still stronger property X ⊥⊥ (Σ, T ).
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(iii) For all φ ∈ Φ(S) and all AX ∈ σ(X), there exists a function wφ(Z) such that,
for all σ ∈ Φ−1(φ) and all AY ∈ σ(Y ),
Eσ(1AX∩AY | Z) = wφ(Z)Eσ(1AY | Z) a.s. [Pσ].
(iv) For all φ ∈ Φ(S) and all AX ∈ σ(X), there exists a function wφ(Z) such that,
for all σ ∈ Φ−1(φ),
Eσ(1AX | Y, Z) = wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]. (3.2)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Using Proposition 3.1 we can obtain further properties of extended conditional
independence. For example, we can show that Definition 3.2 can be equivalently
expressed in two simpler statements of extended conditional independence, or that
when all the decision variables are confined to the right-most term symmetry does
follow. In Section 3.1 we will show still more properties.
Proposition 3.2. Let X , Y , Z be stochastic variables and Φ, Θ decision variables.
Then the following are equivalent:
(i) X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ)
(ii) X ⊥⊥ Y | (Z,Φ,Θ) and X ⊥⊥ Θ | (Z,Φ).
Proof.
(i) ⇒(ii). Since X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), for all φ ∈ Φ(S) and AX ∈ σ(X), there exists
wφ(Z) such that for all σ ∈ Φ−1(φ),
Eσ (1AX | Y, Z) = wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]
which proves that X ⊥⊥ Y | (Z,Φ,Θ). Also, by Remark 3.1,
Eσ (1AX | Z) = wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]
which proves that X ⊥⊥ Θ | (Z,Φ).
(ii) ⇒ (i). Since X ⊥⊥ Y | (Z,Φ,Θ), for all σ ∈ S and AX ∈ σ(X), there exists
wσ(Z) such that
Eσ[1AX | Y, Z] = wσ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]. (3.3)
By Remark 3.1,
Eσ (1AX | Z) = wσ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]. (3.4)
Since X ⊥⊥ Θ | (Z,Φ), for all φ ∈ Φ(S) and AX ∈ σ(X) there exists wφ(Z) such
that, for all σ ∈ Φ−1(φ),
Eσ (1AX | Z) = wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]. (3.5)
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By (3.4) and (3.5),
wσ(Z) = wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ].
Thus, by (3.3),
Eσ (1AX | Y, Z) = wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ],
which proves that X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ).
Proposition 3.3. Let X , Y , Z be stochastic variables, and Σ a decision variable.
Then X ⊥⊥ Y | (Z,Σ) if and only if X ⊥⊥s Y | Z under Pσ for all σ ∈ S.
Proof.
X ⊥⊥ Y | (Z,Σ) is equivalent to: for all σ ∈ S and all AX ∈ σ(X) there exists a
function wσ(Z) such that, for all AY ∈ σ(Y ),
Eσ (1AX∩AY | Z) = wσ(Z)Eσ(1AY | Z) a.s. [Pσ].
In particular, for AY = Ω we have
Eσ (1AX | Z) = wσ(Z) a.s. [Pσ].
The property X ⊥⊥ Y | (Z,Σ) is thus equivalent to: for all σ ∈ S, AX ∈ σ(X),
AY ∈ σ(Y ),
Eσ (1AY ∩AX | Z) = Eσ (1AY | Z)Eσ (1AX | Z) a.s. [Pσ],
which concludes the proof.
Corollary 3.4. X ⊥⊥ Y | (Z,Σ) ⇒ Y ⊥⊥ X | (Z,Σ).
3.1 Some separoid properties
Comparing Definition 3.2 for extended conditional independence with Definition 2.4
for stochastic conditional independence, we observe a close technical, as well as intu-
itive, similarity. This suggests that these two concepts should have similar properties,
and motivates the conjecture that the separoid axioms of conditional independence
will continue to hold for the extended concept. In this Section we show that this is
indeed so, in complete generality, for a subset of the axioms. However, in order to
extend this to other axioms we need to impose additional conditions—this we shall
develop in later Sections.
One important difference between extended conditional independence and stochas-
tic conditional independence concerns the symmetry axiom P1. Whereas symmetry
holds universally for stochastic conditional independence, its application to extended
conditional independence is constrained by the fact that, for Definition 3.2 even to
make sense, the first term x in an extended conditional independence relation of the
form x ⊥⊥ y | z must be fully stochastic, whereas the second term y can contain
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a mixture of stochastic and non-stochastic variables—in which case it would make
no sense to interchange x and y. This restricted symmetry also means that each
of the separoid axioms P2–P5 has a possibly non-equivalent “mirror image” version,
obtained by interchanging the first and second terms in each relation.
The following theorem demonstrates certain specific versions of the separoid ax-
ioms.
Theorem 3.5. Let X , Y , Z, W be stochastic variables and Φ, Θ, Σ be decision
variables. Then the following properties hold.
P1′. X ⊥⊥ Y | (Z,Σ) ⇒ Y ⊥⊥ X | (Z,Σ).
P2′. X ⊥⊥ (Y,Σ) | (Y,Σ).
P3′. X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) and W  Y ⇒ X ⊥⊥ (W,Θ) | (Z,Φ).
P4′. X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) and W  Y ⇒ X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,W,Φ).
P5′. X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) and X ⊥⊥ W | (Y, Z,Θ,Φ) ⇒ X ⊥⊥ (Y,W,Θ) | (Z,Φ).
Proof.
P1′. Proved in Proposition 3.3.
P2′. Let σ ∈ S and AX ∈ σ(X). Then for all AY ∈ σ(Y ),
Eσ(1AX∩AY | Y ) = 1AY Eσ(1AX | Y ) a.s. [Pσ]
which concludes the proof.
P3′. Let φ ∈ Φ(S) and AX ∈ σ(X). Since X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), there exists wφ(Z)
such that, for all σ ∈ Φ−1(φ),
Eσ (1AX | Y, Z) = wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ].
Since W  Y , it follows from Lemma 2.2 that σ(W ) ⊆ σ(Y ) and thus σ(W,Z) ⊆
σ(Y, Z). Then
Eσ (1AX |W,Z) = Eσ {Eσ(1AX | Y, Z) | W,Z} a.s. [Pσ]
= Eσ {wφ(Z) |W,Z} a.s. [Pσ]
= wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]
which concludes the proof.
P4′. Let φ ∈ Φ(S) and AX ∈ σ(X). Since X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), there exists wφ(Z)
such that, for all σ ∈ Φ−1(φ),
Eσ (1AX | Y, Z) = wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ].
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Since W  Y , it follows from Lemma 2.2 that σ(W ) ⊆ σ(Y ) and thus σ(Y, Z,W ) =
σ(Y, Z). Then
Eσ (1AX | Y, Z,W ) = Eσ (1AX | Y, Z) a.s. [Pσ]
= wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]
which concludes the proof.
P5′. Let φ ∈ Φ(S) and AX ∈ σ(X). Since X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), there exists wφ(Z)
such that, for all σ ∈ Φ−1(φ),
Eσ (1AX | Y, Z) = wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ].
Since W  Y , it follows from Lemma 2.2 that σ(W ) ⊆ σ(Y ) and thus σ(Y,W,Z) =
σ(Y, Z). Then
Eσ (1AX | Y,W,Z) = Eσ (1AX | Y, Z) a.s. [Pσ]
= wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]
which concludes the proof.
Lack of symmetry however, introduces some complications as the symmetric
equivalents of axioms P3′, P4′ and P5′ do not automatically follow.
Consider the following statements, which mirror P3′–P5′:
P3′′. X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) and W  X ⇒ W ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ).
P4′′. X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) and W  X ⇒ X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,W,Φ).
P5′′. X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) andW ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (X,Z,Φ)⇒ (X,W ) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ).
P3′′ follows straightforwardly, and P5′′ will be proved to hold in Proposition 3.7 be-
low. However, P4′′ presents some difficulty. We will see below (Corollary 4.6, Proposi-
tion 5.1, Proposition 5.2) that we can obtain P4′′ under certain additional conditions,
but validity in full generality remains an open problem.
Lemma 3.6. Let X , Y , Z, W be stochastic variables and Φ, Θ be decision variables.
Then
X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) and W  X ⇒ (W,Z) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ).
Proof. Since X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), for all φ ∈ Φ(S) and all AX ∈ σ(X) there exists
wφ(Z) such that, for all σ ∈ Φ−1(φ),
Eσ (1AX | Y, Z) = wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]. (3.6)
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To prove that (W,Z) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), let φ ∈ Φ(S) and AW,Z ∈ σ(W,Z). We will
show that there exists aφ(Z) such that, for all σ ∈ Φ−1(φ),
Eσ
(
1AW,Z | Y, Z
)
= aφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]. (3.7)
Consider
D = {AW,Z ∈ σ(W,Z) : there exists aφ(Z) such that (3.7) holds}
and
Π = {AW,Z ∈ σ(W,Z) : AW,Z = AW ∩ AZ for AW ∈ σ(W ) and AZ ∈ σ(Z)}.
Then σ(Π) = σ(W,Z) [Resnick, 2014, p. 73]. We will show that D is a d-system
that contains Π. We can then apply Dynkin’s lemma [Billingsley, 1995, p. 42] to
conclude that D contains σ(Π) = σ(W,Z).
To show that D contains Π, let AW,Z = AW ∩ AZ with AW ∈ σ(W ) and AZ ∈ σ(Z).
Then
Eσ (1AW1AZ | Y, Z) = 1AZEσ (1AW | Y, Z) a.s. [Pσ]
= 1AZwφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ] by (3.6).
Now define aφ(Z) := 1AZwφ(Z) and we are done.
To show that D is a d-system, first note that Ω ∈ D. Also, for A1, A2 ∈ D such
that A1 ⊆ A2, we can readily see that A2 \ A1 ∈ D. Now consider an increasing
sequence (An : n ∈ N) in D and denote by a
An
φ (Z) the corresponding function such
that (3.7) holds. Then An ↑ ∪nAn and 1An ↑ 1∪nAn pointwise. Thus, by conditional
monotone convergence [Durrett, 2013, p. 193],
Eσ
(
1∪nAn | Y, Z
)
= lim
n→∞
Eσ (1An | Y, Z) a.s. [Pσ]
= lim
n→∞
aAnφ (Z) a.s. [Pσ].
Now define aφ(Z) := lim
n→∞
aAnφ (Z) and we are done.
Proposition 3.7. Let X , Y , Z, W be stochastic variables and Φ, Θ decision vari-
ables. Then
P5′′: X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) and W ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (X,Z,Φ)⇒ (X,W ) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ).
Proof. Following the same approach as in the proof of Lemma 3.6, to prove that
(X,W ) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) it is enough to show that, for all φ ∈ Φ(S) and all AX,W =
AX ∩ AW where AX ∈ σ(X) and AW ∈ σ(W ), there exists wφ(Z) such that, for all
σ ∈ Φ−1(φ),
Eσ
(
1AX,W | Y, Z
)
= wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]. (3.8)
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Since W ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (X,Z,Φ), for all φ ∈ Φ(S) and all AW ∈ σ(W ) there exists
w1φ(X,Z) such that, for all σ ∈ Φ
−1(φ),
Eσ (1AW | X, Y, Z) = w
1
φ(X,Z) a.s. [Pσ]. (3.9)
Also by Lemma 3.6,
X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ)⇒ (X,Z) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ).
Thus, for all φ ∈ Φ(S) and all h(X,Z), there exists w2φ(Z) such that, for all σ ∈
Φ−1(φ),
Eσ {h(X,Z) | Y, Z} = w
2
φ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]. (3.10)
Let φ ∈ Φ(S) and AX,W = AX ∩ AW , where AX ∈ σ(X) and AW ∈ σ(W ). Then
Eσ (1AX∩AW | Y, Z) = Eσ {Eσ (1AX∩AW | X, Y, Z) | Y, Z} a.s. [Pσ]
= Eσ {1AXEσ (1AW | X, Y, Z) | Y, Z} a.s. [Pσ]
= Eσ
{
1AXw
1
φ(X,Z) | Y, Z
}
a.s. [Pσ] by (3.9)
= w2φ(Z) a.s. [Pσ] by (3.10),
which proves (3.8).
4 A Bayesian approach
In the present Section, we introduce a Bayesian construction in an attempt to justify
the remaining separoid axioms. We extend the original space in order to construe both
stochastic and non-stochastic variables as measurable functions on the new space and
create an analogy between extended conditional independence and stochastic condi-
tional independence. Similar ideas can be found in a variety of contexts in probability
theory and statistics. Examples include Poisson random processes [Kingman, 1993,
pp. 82–84], or Bayesian approaches to statistics [Kolmogorov, 1942]. We will see that,
under the assumption of a discrete regime space, extended conditional independence
and stochastic conditional independence are equivalent. Thus we can continue to
apply all the properties P1s–P5s of Theorem 2.4.
Consider a measurable space (Ω,A) and a regime space S and let F be a σ-algebra
of subsets of S. We can expand the original space (Ω,A) and consider the product
space Ω × S with its corresponding σ-algebra A⊗ F , where A⊗ F := σ(A× F) :=
σ({A× B : A ∈ A, B ∈ F}). Thus, we can regard all stochastic variables X, Y, Z, . . .
defined on (Ω,A) also as defined on (Ω × S,A ⊗ F) and all F -measurable decision
variables Θ,Φ, . . . defined on S also as defined on (Ω × S,A ⊗ F). To see this,
consider any stochastic variable X : (Ω,A)→ (R,BX). For any such X we can define
X∗ : (Ω × S,A ⊗ F) → (R,BX) by X∗(ω, σ) = X(ω). It is readily seen that X∗ is
A ⊗ F -measurable. Similar justification applies for decision variables. Thus, in the
18
initial space (Ω,A) we can talk about extended conditional independence and in the
product space (Ω × S,A⊗ F), after we equip it with a probability measure, we can
talk about stochastic conditional independence. To rigorously justify the equivalence
of extended conditional independence and stochastic conditional independence, we
will need the following results.
Lemma 4.1. Let f : Ω × S → R be A ⊗ F -measurable. Define for all σ ∈ S,
fσ : Ω → R by fσ(ω) := f(ω, σ). Then fσ is A-measurable. If further f is bounded,
define for all σ ∈ S, Eσ(fσ) : S → R by Eσ(fσ) :=
∫
Ω
fσ(ω)Pσ(dω). Then the function
σ 7→ Eσ(fσ) is bounded and F -measurable.
Proof. See Billingsley [1995, p. 231, Theorem 18.1, and p. 234, Theorem 18.3].
Now let pi be a probability measure on (F,F). For A∗ ∈ A⊗F , define
P
∗(A∗) :=
∫
S
∫
Ω
1A∗(ω, σ)Pσ(dω)pi(dσ). (4.1)
Theorem 4.2. P∗ is the unique probability measure on A⊗F such that
P
∗(A× B) =
∫
B
Pσ(A)pi(dσ) (4.2)
for all A ∈ A and B ∈ F .
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, P∗ : A ⊗ F → [0, 1] is a well defined function. To prove that
P
∗ is a measure, we need to prove countable additivity. So let (An : n ∈ N) be a
sequence of disjoint sets in A⊗F and define Bn := ∪nk=1Ak an increasing sequence of
sets. By monotone convergence theorem, for each σ ∈ S, as n→∞,∫
Ω
1Bn(ω, σ)Pσ(dω) ↑
∫
Ω
1∪kBk(ω, σ)Pσ(dω),
and hence ∫
S
∫
Ω
1Bn(ω, σ)Pσ(dω)pi(dσ) ↑
∫
S
∫
Ω
1∪kBk(ω, σ)Pσ(dω)pi(dσ). (4.3)
Thus
P
∗
(⋃
n
An
)
= P∗
(⋃
n
Bn
)
= lim
n→∞
P
∗(Bn) by (4.3)
= lim
n→∞
∫
S
∫
Ω
n∑
k=1
1An(ω, σ)Pσ(dω)pi(dσ) since An disjoint
=
∑
n
P
∗(An).
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We can readily see that P∗ is a probability measure and, since 1A×B = 1A1B, prop-
erty (4.2) holds for all A ∈ A and B ∈ F . Since A× F := {A× B : A ∈ A, B ∈ F}
is a pi-system generating A⊗ F and P∗(Ω× S) = 1 < ∞, P∗ is uniquely determined
by its values on A × F , by the uniqueness of extension theorem [Billingsley, 1995,
p. 42].
Theorem 4.3. Let f : Ω×S → R be an A⊗F -measurable integrable function. Then
E
∗(f) =
∫
S
∫
Ω
f(ω, σ)Pσ(dω)pi(dσ). (4.4)
Proof. Since f is integrable, E∗(f) = E∗(f+)−E∗(f−). Thus, it is enough to show (4.4)
for non-negative A ⊗ F -measurable functions. By definition of P∗ in Theorem 4.2,
(4.4) holds for all f = 1A, where A ∈ A⊗F . By linearity of the integrals, it also holds
for functions of the form f =
∑m
k=1 ak1Ak , where 0 ≤ ak < ∞, Ak ∈ A ⊗ F for all
k and m ∈ N. We call functions of this form simple functions. For any non-negative
A⊗F -measurable function f , consider the sequence of non-negative simple functions
fn = min
{
⌊2nf⌋
2n
, n
}
. Then (4.4) holds for fn and fn ↑ f . By monotone convergence,
E
∗(fn) ↑ E∗(f) and, for each σ ∈ S,∫
Ω
fn(ω, σ)Pσ(dω) ↑
∫
Ω
f(ω, σ)Pσ(dω),
and hence ∫
S
∫
Ω
fn(ω, σ)Pσ(dω)pi(dσ) ↑
∫
S
∫
Ω
f(ω, σ)Pσ(dω)pi(dσ).
Hence (4.4) holds for f .
In the previous theorems, we have rigorously constructed a new probability mea-
sure P∗ on the measurable space (Ω × S,A ⊗ F) and also obtained an expression
for the integral of a A ⊗ F -measurable function under P∗. We now use this expres-
sion to justify the analogy between extended conditional independence and stochastic
conditional independence in the case of a discrete regime space.
4.1 Discrete regime space
We now suppose that S is discrete, and take F to comprise all subsets of S. In
particular, every decision variable is F -measurable. Morover in this case we can, and
shall, require pi({σ}) > 0 for all σ ∈ S.
We will keep the notation introduced above and for a stochastic variable X :
(Ω,A) → (R,BX) we will denote by X∗ : (Ω × S,A ⊗ F) → (R,BX) the function
defined by X∗(ω, σ) = X(ω). Similarly for a decision variable Θ : S → Θ(S) we will
denote by Θ∗ : (Ω × S,A ⊗ F) → (R,BX) the function defined by Θ∗(ω, σ) = Θ(σ).
We will use similar conventions for all the variables we consider.
20
Now (4.4) becomes:
E
∗(f) =
∑
σ∈S
∫
Ω
f(ω, σ)Pσ(dω)pi(σ)
=
∑
σ∈S
Eσ(fσ)pi(σ).
Remark 4.1. Note that for any X∗ as above, σ(X∗) = σ(X) × {S}. Similarly, for
any Θ∗ as above, σ(Θ∗) = {Ω} × σ(Θ). Thus
σ(X∗,Θ∗) = σ({AX∗ ∩AΘ∗ : AX∗ ∈ σ(X
∗), AΘ∗ ∈ σ(Θ
∗)}) (see Resnick [2014, p. 73])
= σ({AX∗ ∩AΘ∗ : AX∗ ∈ σ(X)× {S}, AΘ∗ ∈ {Ω} × σ(Θ)})
= σ({(AX × S) ∩ (Ω× AΘ) : AX ∈ σ(X), AΘ ∈ σ(Θ)})
= σ({AX ×AΘ : AX ∈ σ(X), AΘ ∈ σ(Θ)})
=: σ(X)⊗ σ(Θ).
Thus, for any σ ∈ S and AX∗ ∈ σ(X
∗), the function 1σAX∗ : Ω → {0, 1} defined by
1
σ
AX∗
(ω) := 1AX∗ (ω, σ) does not depend on σ. It is equal to 1AX , for AX ∈ σ(X)
such that AX∗ = AX × {S}. Also for AX∗,Θ∗ ∈ σ(X∗,Θ∗), the function 1AX∗,Θ∗ is
(σ(X)⊗σ(Θ))-measurable, and by Lemma 4.1, for σ ∈ S, the function 1σAX∗,Θ∗ : Ω→
{0, 1} defined by 1σAX∗,Θ∗(ω) := 1AX∗,Θ∗ (ω, σ) is σ(X)-measurable. 1
σ
AX∗,Θ∗
(ω) is equal
to 1Aσ
X
for AσX ∈ σ(X) such that A
σ
X is the section of AX∗,Θ∗ at σ.
Theorem 4.4. Let X, Y, Z be A-measurable functions on Ω, and let Φ,Θ be decision
variables on S, where S is discrete. Suppose that Θ is complementary to Φ. Also,
let X∗, Y ∗, Z∗ and Φ∗, Θ∗ be the corresponding A⊗ F -measurable functions. Then
X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) if and only if X∗ ⊥⊥s (Y ∗,Θ∗) | (Z∗,Φ∗).
Proof.
⇒. Since X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), by Proposition 3.1, for all φ ∈ Φ(S) and all AX ∈
σ(X), there exists a function wφ(Z) such that, for all σ ∈ Φ−1(φ),
Eσ(1AX | Y, Z) = wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ], (4.5)
i.e.,
Eσ(1AX1AY,Z ) = Eσ
{
wφ(Z)1AY,Z
}
whenever AY,Z ∈ σ(Y, Z). (4.6)
To show that X∗ ⊥⊥ (Y ∗,Θ∗) | (Z∗,Φ∗), by Proposition 2.3 we need to show that,
for all AX∗ ∈ σ(X∗), there exists a function w(Z∗,Φ∗) such that
E
∗ (1AX∗ | Y
∗,Θ∗, Z∗,Φ∗) = w(Z∗,Φ∗) a.s.,
i.e.,
E
∗(1AX∗1AY ∗,Θ∗,Z∗,Φ∗ ) = E
∗
{
w(Z∗,Φ∗)1AY ∗,Θ∗,Z∗,Φ∗
}
(4.7)
whenever AY ∗,Θ∗,Z∗,Φ∗ ∈ σ(Y ∗,Θ∗, Z∗,Φ∗).
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Let AX∗ ∈ σ(X
∗) and define w(z∗, φ∗) = wφ∗(z
∗) as in (4.6). Then for all
AY ∗,Θ∗,Z∗,Φ∗ ∈ σ(Y ∗,Θ∗, Z∗,Φ∗),
E
∗(1AX∗1AY ∗,Θ∗,Z∗,Φ∗ ) =
∑
σ∈S
Eσ(1AX1AσY,Z )pi(σ)
=
∑
σ∈S
Eσ
{
wφ(Z)1Aσ
Y,Z
}
pi(σ) by (4.6)
= E∗
{
w(Z∗,Φ∗)1AY ∗,Θ∗,Z∗,Φ∗
}
which proves (4.7).
⇐. To show that X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), let φ ∈ Φ(S) and AX ∈ σ(X). Then, for any
σo ∈ Φ−1(φ),
Eσo(1AX1AY,Z )pi(σo) =
∑
σ∈S
Eσ
{
1AX1AY,Z1σo(σ)
}
pi(σ)
= E∗(1AX∗1AY,Z×{σo})
= E∗
{
w(Z∗,Φ∗)1AY,Z×{σo}
}
by (4.7)
=
∑
σ∈S
Eσ
{
w(Z; Φ(σ))1AY,Z1σo(σ)
}
pi(σ)
= Eσo
{
w(Z; Φ(σo))1AY,Z
}
pi(σo).
Since pi(σo) > 0, we have proved (4.6) with wφ(z) = w(z, φ).
Corollary 4.5. Suppose we are given a collection of extended conditional indepen-
dence properties as in the form of Definition 3.2. If the regime space S is discrete,
any deduction made using the axioms of conditional independence will be valid, so
long as, in both premisses and conclusions, no non-stochastic variables appear in the
left-most term in a conditional independence statement (we are however allowed to
violate this condition in intermediate steps of an argument).
Corollary 4.6. In the case of a discrete regime space, we have:
P4′′: X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) and W  X ⇒ X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,W,Φ).
5 Other approaches
Inspecting the proof of Theorem 4.4, we see that the assumption of discreteness of
the regime space S is crucial. If we have an uncountable regime space S and assign a
distribution pi over it, the arguments for the forward direction will still apply but the
arguments for the reverse direction will not. Intuitively, this is because (4.1) holds
almost everywhere but not necessarily everywhere. Thus we cannot immediately
extend it to hold for all σ ∈ S as in (4.5). However, using another, more direct,
approach we can still deduce P4′′ if we impose appropriate conditions. In particular
this will hold if the stochastic variables are discrete. Alternatively, we can use a
domination condition on the set of regimes.
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5.1 Discrete variables
Proposition 5.1. Let X , Y , Z, W be discrete stochastic variables, Φ, Θ be decision
variables. Then
P4′′: X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) and W  X ⇒ X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,W,Φ).
Proof. To show that X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,W,Φ) we need to show that, for all φ ∈ Φ(S)
and all AX ∈ σ(X), there exists wφ(Z,W ) such that, for all σ ∈ Φ−1(φ),
Eσ (1AX | Y, Z,W ) = wφ(Z,W ) a.s. [Pσ],
i.e.,
Eσ
(
1AX1AY,Z,W
)
= Eσ
{
wφ(Z,W )1AY,Z,W
}
whenever AY,Z,W ∈ σ(Y, Z,W ). (5.1)
Observe that it is enough to show (5.1) forAY,Z,W ∈ σ(Y, Z,W ) such that Pσ(AY,Z,W ) >
0. Also since X , Y , Z and W are discrete we need to show (5.1) only for sets of the
form {X = x} and {Y = y, Z = z,W = w}. Thus it is enough to show that, for
all φ ∈ Φ(S) and all x, there exists wφ(Z,W ) such that, for all σ ∈ Φ−1(φ), and all
y, z, w such that Pσ(Y = y, Z = z,W = w) > 0,
Eσ
(
1{X=x}1{Y=y,Z=z,W=w}
)
= Eσ
{
wφ(Z,W )1{Y=y,Z=z,W=w}
}
.
Let φ ∈ Φ(S). For σ ∈ Φ−1(φ) and all x, y, z, w such that Pσ(Y = y, Z = z,W =
w) > 0,
Eσ
(
1{X=x}1{Y=y,Z=z,W=w}
)
= Pσ (X = x, Y = y, Z = z,W = w)
= Pσ (X = x | Y = y, Z = z,W = w)Pσ (Y = y, Z = z,W = w)
=
Pσ (X = x,W = w | Y = y, Z = z)
Pσ (W = w | Y = y, Z = z)
Pσ (Y = y, Z = z,W = w) .
(5.2)
Since X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) and W  X , there exist w1φ(Z) and w
2
φ(Z) such that
Eσ
(
1{X=x,W=w} | Y, Z
)
= w1φ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]
and
Eσ
(
1{W=w} | Y, Z
)
= w2φ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]
where w1φ(Z) = 0 unless w = W (x).
Define
wφ(z) =
{
w1
φ
(z)
w2
φ
(z)
if w2φ(z) 6= 0,
0 if w2φ(z) = 0
and note that w2φ(z) 6= 0 when Pσ(Y = y, Z = z,W = w) 6= 0. Also note that since
wφ(Z) is σ(Z)-measurable it is also σ(W,Z)-measurable. Returning to!(5.2) we get
Eσ
(
1{X=x}1{Y=y,Z=z,W=w}
)
= wφ(z)Pσ (Y = y, Z = z,W = w)
= Eσ
{
wφ(Z)1{Y=y,Z=z,W=w}
}
which concludes the proof.
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5.2 Dominating regime
Definition 5.1 (Dominating regime). Let S index a set of probability measures on
(Ω,A). For S0 ⊆ S, we say that σ
∗ ∈ S0 is a dominating regime in S0, if, for all
σ ∈ S0, Pσ ≪ Pσ∗ ; that is,
Pσ∗(A) = 0⇒ Pσ(A) = 0 for all A ∈ A and all σ ∈ S0.
Proposition 5.2. Let X , Y , Z,W be stochastic variables, Φ, Θ be decision variables.
Suppose that, for all φ ∈ Φ(S), there exists a dominating regime σφ ∈ Φ−1(φ). Then
P4′′: X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) and W  X ⇒ X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,W,Φ).
Proof. By Proposition 3.2, it suffices to prove the following two statements:
X ⊥⊥ Y | (Z,W,Φ,Θ) (5.3)
and
X ⊥⊥ Θ | (Z,W,Φ). (5.4)
To prove (5.3), we will use Proposition 3.3 and prove equivalently that Y ⊥⊥ X |
(Z,W,Φ,Θ). Note first that since X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), by Proposition 3.2 it follows
that X ⊥⊥ Y | (Z,Φ,Θ), and by Proposition 3.3 it follows that Y ⊥⊥ X | (Z,Φ,Θ).
Also, since W  X , by Lemma 2.2 it follows that σ(W ) ⊆ σ(X). Let (φ, θ) ∈
(Φ(S),Θ(S)), σ = (Φ,Θ)−1(φ, θ) and AY ∈ σ(Y ). Then
Eσ (1AY | X,Z,W ) = Eσ (1AY | X,Z) a.s. [Pσ] since σ(W ) ⊆ σ(X)
= Eσ (1AY | Z) a.s. [Pσ] since Y ⊥⊥ X | (Z,Φ,Θ),
which proves that Y ⊥⊥ X | (Z,W,Φ,Θ).
To prove (5.4), let φ ∈ Φ(S) and AX ∈ σ(X). We will show that there exists
wφ(Z,W ) such that, for all σ ∈ Φ−1(φ),
Eσ (1AX | Z,W ) = wφ(Z,W ) a.s. [Pσ],
i.e.,
Eσ
(
1AX1AZ,W
)
= Eσ
{
wφ(Z,W )1AZ,W
}
whenever AZ,W ∈ σ(Z,W ).
Let AZ,W ∈ σ(Z,W ) and note that
Eσ
(
1AX1AZ,W
)
= Eσ
{
Eσ(1AX1AZ,W | Z)
}
. (5.5)
Since X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), by Lemma 3.6 it follows that (X,Z) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ),
and by Proposition 3.2 that (X,Z) ⊥⊥ Θ | (Z,Φ). Also, since W  X there exists
aφ(Z) such that
Eσ(1AX1AZ,W | Z) = aφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]. (5.6)
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In particular, for the dominating regime σφ ∈ Φ
−1(φ),
Eσφ(1AX1AZ,W | Z) = aφ(Z) a.s. [Pσφ ]
and thus
Eσφ
{
Eσφ(1AX1AZ,W | Z,W ) | Z
}
= aφ(Z) a.s. [Pσφ].
Since Pσ ≪ Pσφ for all σ ∈ Φ
−1(φ), it follows that, for all σ ∈ Φ−1(φ),
Eσφ
{
Eσφ(1AX1AZ,W | Z,W ) | Z
}
= aφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]. (5.7)
Thus, by (5.6) and (5.7), we get that
Eσ(1AX1AZ,W | Z) = Eσφ
{
Eσφ(1AX1AZ,W | Z,W ) | Z
}
a.s. [Pσ]. (5.8)
Similarly,
Eσφ
{
Eσφ(1AX1AZ,W | Z,W ) | Z
}
= Eσ
{
Eσφ(1AX1AZ,W | Z,W ) | Z
}
a.s. [Pσ]. (5.9)
Returning to (5.5), it follows that
Eσ
(
1AX1AZ,W
)
= Eσ
[
Eσφ
{
1AZ,WEσφ(1AX | Z,W ) | Z
}]
by (5.8)
= Eσ
[
Eσ
{
1AZ,WEσφ(1AX | Z,W ) | Z
}]
by (5.9)
= Eσ
{
1AZ,WEσφ(1AX | Z,W )
}
.
6 Pairwise conditional independence
Yet another path is to relax the notion of extended conditional independence. Here we
introduce a weaker version that we term pairwise extended conditional independence.
Definition 6.1. Let X , Y and Z be stochastic variables and let Θ and Φ be de-
cision variables. We say that X is pairwise (conditionally) independent of (Y,Θ)
given (Z,Φ), and write X ⊥⊥p (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), if for all φ ∈ Φ(S), all real, bounded
and measurable functions h, and all pairs {σ1, σ2} ∈ Φ−1(φ), there exists a function
wσ1,σ2φ (Z) such that
Eσ1 {h(X) | Y, Z} = w
σ1,σ2
φ (Z) a.s. [Pσ1 ]
and
Eσ2 {h(X) | Y, Z} = w
σ1,σ2
φ (Z) a.s. [Pσ2 ].
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It is readily seen that extended conditional independence implies pairwise ex-
tended conditional independence, but the converse is false. In Definition 6.1, for all
φ ∈ Φ(S), we only require a common version for the corresponding conditional ex-
pectation for every pair of regimes {σ1, σ2} ∈ Φ−1(φ), but we do not require that
these versions agree on one function that can serve as a version for the corresponding
conditional expectation simultaneously in all regimes σ ∈ Φ−1(φ).
Under this weaker definition, the analogues of P1′ to P5′, and of P3′′ and P5′′,
can be seen to hold just as in Section 3.1. Also, by confining attention to two regimes
at a time and applying Corollary 4.6, the analogue of P4′′ will hold without further
conditions.
It can be shown that, when there exists a dominating regime, pairwise extended
conditional independence is equivalent to extended conditional independence. This
property can be used to supply an alternative proof of Proposition 5.2.
7 Further extensions
So far we have studied extended conditional independence relations of the form
X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), where the left-most term is fully stochastic. We now wish to ex-
tend this to the most general expression, of the form (X,K) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), where
X, Y, Z are stochastic variables and K,Θ,Φ are decision variables, and to investigate
the validity of the separoid axioms.
Consider first the expression K ⊥⊥ Θ | Z. Our desired intuitive interpretation of
this is that conditioning on the stochastic variable Z renders the decision variables K
and Θ variation independent. We need to turn this intuition into a rigorous definition,
taking account of the fact that Z may have different distributions in the different
regimes σ ∈ S, whereas K and Θ are functions defined on S.
One way to interpret this intuition is to consider, for each value z of Z, the set Sz
of regimes that for which z is a “possible outcome,” and ask that the decision variables
be variation independent on this restricted set. In order to make this rigorous, we
shall require that Z : (Ω,A) → (FZ ,FZ) where (FZ ,FZ) is a topological space with
its Borel σ-algebra, and introduce
Sz := {σ ∈ S : Pσ(Z ∈ U) > 0 for every open set U ⊆ FZ containing z} .
In particular, when Z is discrete, with the discrete topology,
Sz := {σ ∈ S : Pσ(Z = z) > 0} .
We now formalise the slightly more general expression K ⊥⊥ Θ | (Z,Φ) in the
following definition.
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Definition 7.1. Let Z be a stochastic variable and K,Θ,Φ decision variables. We say
that Θ is (conditionally) independent of K given (Z,Φ), and write Θ ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ)
if, for all z ∈ Z(Ω), Θ ⊥⊥v K | Φ [Sz].
We now wish to introduce further definitions, to allow stochastic and decision
variables to appear together in the left-most term of a conditional independence state-
ment. Recall that in Definition 3.2, we defined X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) only when Θ and
Φ are complementary on S. Similarly, we will define (X,K) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) only
when K, Θ and Φ are complementary, i.e., when the function (K,Θ,Φ) on S is a sur-
jection. Our interpretation of (X,K) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) will now be a combination
of Definitions 3.2 and 7.1. We start with a special case.
Definition 7.2. Let Y, Z be stochastic variables, andK,Θ,Φ complementary decision
variables. We say that (Y,Θ) is (conditionally) independent of K given (Z,Φ), and
write (Y,Θ) ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ), if Y ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ,Θ) and Θ ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ). In this case
we may also say that K is (conditionally) independent of (Y,Θ) given (Z,Φ), and
write K ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ).
Finally, the general definition:
Definition 7.3. Let X, Y, Z be stochastic variables and K,Θ,Φ complementary de-
cision variables. We say that (X,K) is (conditionally) independent of (Y,Θ) given
(Z,Φ), and write (X,K) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), if
X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ, K), and K ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ).
7.1 Separoid properties
We now wish to investigate the extent to which versions of the separoid axioms apply
to the above general definition. In this context the relevant set V is the set of pairs
of the form (Y,Θ), where Y is a stochastic variable defined on Ω and Θ is a decision
variable defined on S.
For a full separoid treatment we also need to introduce a quasiorder  on V .
A natural definition would be: (W,Λ)  (Y,Θ) if W = f(Y ) for some measurable
function f (also denoted by W  Y ) and Λ = h(Θ) for some function h. Then (V,)
becomes a join semilattice, with join (Y,Θ) ∨ (W,Λ) ≈ ((Y,W ), (Θ,Λ)). However,
whenever we consider a relation (X,K) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) we require that K,Θ,Φ be
complementary, a property that would typically be lost on replacing Θ by a non-trivial
reduction Λ = h(Θ). Consequently, we will only be considering non-trivial reductions
of stochastic variables. This constraint modifies and reduces the separoid properties.
Theorem 7.1 (Separoid-type properties). Let X, Y, Z,W be stochastic variables and
K,Θ,Φ be decision variables. Then the following properties hold:
P1g. (X,K) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) ⇒ (Y,Θ) ⊥⊥ (X,K) | (Z,Φ).
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P2g. (X,K) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Y,Θ).
P3g. (X,K) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), W  Y ⇒ (X,K) ⊥⊥ (W,Θ) | (Z,Φ).
P4g. Under the conditions of Corollary 4.6, Proposition 5.1 and Proposition 5.2,
(X,K) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), W  Y ⇒ (X,K) ⊥⊥ Y | (Z,W,Φ,Θ).
P5g.
(X,K) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ)
and
(X,K) ⊥⊥ W | (Y, Z,Θ,Φ)

 ⇒ (X,K) ⊥⊥ (Y,W,Θ) | (Z,Φ).
Proof.
P1g. By Definition 7.3 and Proposition 3.2, we need to show that
Y ⊥⊥ X | (Z,Φ,Θ, K) (7.1)
Y ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ,Θ) (7.2)
X ⊥⊥ Θ | (Z,Φ, K) (7.3)
K ⊥⊥ Θ | (Z,Φ). (7.4)
Since (X,K) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), we have that
X ⊥⊥ Y | (Z,Φ, K,Θ) (7.5)
X ⊥⊥ Θ | (Z,Φ, K) (7.6)
Y ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ,Θ) (7.7)
Θ ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ). (7.8)
It follows that (7.2) and (7.3) hold automatically. Also applying P1′ to (7.5) we
deduce (7.1). Rephrasing (7.8) in terms of variation independence, we have that, for
all z ∈ Z(Ω), Θ ⊥⊥v K | Φ [Sz]. Thus applying P1
v to (7.8) we deduce that, for all
z ∈ Z(Ω), K ⊥⊥v Θ | Φ [Sz], i.e. (7.4).
P2g. By Definition 7.3, we need to show that
X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Y,Θ, K) (7.9)
Y ⊥⊥ K | (Y,Θ) (7.10)
Θ ⊥⊥ K | (Y,Θ). (7.11)
By P2′ we have that X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ, K) | (Y,Θ, K) which is identical to (7.9). To
show (7.10), let θ ∈ Θ(S) and AY ∈ σ(Y ). We seek wθ(Y ) such that, for all
σ ∈ Θ−1(θ),
Eσ (1AY | Y ) = wθ(Y ) a.s. [Pσ].
But note that
Eσ (1AY | Y ) = 1AY a.s. [Pσ].
To show (7.11), let y ∈ Y (Ω). By P2v, we have that
K ⊥⊥v Θ | Θ [Sy]. (7.12)
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Applying P1v to (7.10) we deduce that Θ ⊥⊥v K | Θ [Sy], i.e. (7.11).
P3g. By Definition 7.3, we need to show that
X ⊥⊥ (W,Θ) | (Z,Φ, K) (7.13)
W ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ,Θ) (7.14)
Θ ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ). (7.15)
Since (X,K) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), we have that
X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ, K) (7.16)
Y ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ,Θ) (7.17)
Θ ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ). (7.18)
Since W  Y , applying P3′ to (7.16), we deduce (7.13). Also, applying P3′′ to (7.17)
we deduce (7.14).
P4g. By Definition 7.3, we need to show that
X ⊥⊥ Y | (Z,W,Φ,Θ, K) (7.19)
Y ⊥⊥ K | (Z,W,Φ,Θ). (7.20)
Since (X,K) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ), we have that
X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ, K) (7.21)
Y ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ,Θ) (7.22)
Θ ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ). (7.23)
Since W  Y , applying P4′ to (7.21) we deduce that X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,W,Φ, K)
which implies (7.19). Also, under the additional conditions assumed, (7.22) im-
plies (7.20).
P5g. By Definition 7.3, we need to show that
X ⊥⊥ (Y,W,Θ) | (Z,Φ, K) (7.24)
(Y,W ) ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ,Θ) (7.25)
Θ ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ). (7.26)
Since (X,K) ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ) and (X,K) ⊥⊥ W | (Y, Z,Θ,Φ), we have that
X ⊥⊥ (Y,Θ) | (Z,Φ, K) (7.27)
Y ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ,Θ) (7.28)
Θ ⊥⊥ K | (Z,Φ) (7.29)
X ⊥⊥ W | (Y, Z,Θ,Φ, K) (7.30)
W ⊥⊥ K | (Y, Z,Θ,Φ). (7.31)
It follows that (7.26) holds automatically. Also applying P5′ to (7.27) and (7.30) we
deduce (7.24) and applying P5′′ to (7.28) and (7.31) we deduce (7.25).
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8 Applications of extended conditional indepen-
dence
The driving force behind this work was the need to establish a rigorous basis for a
wide range of statistical concepts—in particular the Decision Theoretic framework for
statistical causality. In the Decision Theoretic framework we have stochastic variables
whose outcomes are determined by Nature, and decision variables that determine
the probabilistic regime generating the stochastic variables. Using the language of
extended conditional independence we are able to express and manipulate conditions
that allow us to transfer probabilistic information between regimes, and thus use
information gleaned from one regime to understand a different, unobserved regime of
interest.
Here we illustrate, with two examples, how the language and the calculus of
extended conditional independence can be applied to identify causal quantities. For
numerous further applications see Dawid [2015].
Example 8.1. [Average causal effect] Suppose we are concerned with the effect of a
binary treatment T (with value 1 denoting active treatment, and 0 denoting placebo)
on a disease variable Y . There are 3 regimes of interest, indicated by a regime in-
dicator Σ: Σ = 1 [resp., Σ = 0] denotes the situation where the patient is assigned
treatment T = 1 [resp., T = 0] by external intervention; whereas Σ = ∅ indicates an
observational regime, in which T is chosen, in some random way beyond the analyst’s
control,“by Nature.” For example, the data may have been gathered by doctors or in
hospitals, and the criteria on which the treatment decisions were based not recorded.
A typical focus of interest is the Average Causal Effect (ACE) [Guo and Dawid,
2010, Geneletti and Dawid, 2011],
ACE := E1(Y )− E0(Y )
where Eσ(·) = E(· | σ) denotes expectation under regime Σ = σ. This is a direct
comparison of the average effects of giving treatment versus placebo for a given pa-
tient. However in practice, for various reasons (ethical, financial, pragmatic, etc.), we
may not be able to observe Y under these interventional regimes, and then can not
compare them directly. Instead, we might have access to data generated under the
observational regime, where other variables might affect both the treatment choice
and the variable of interest. In such a case, the distribution of the outcome of inter-
est, for a patient receiving treatment T = t, cannot necessarily be assumed to be the
same as in the corresponding interventional regime Σ = t.
However, if the observational data have been generated and collected from a
Randomised Control Trial (i.e. the sample is randomly chosen and the treatment is
randomly allocated), we could reasonably impose the following extended conditional
independence condition:
Y ⊥⊥ Σ | T . (8.1)
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This condition expresses the property that, given information on the treatment T , the
distribution of Y is independent of the regime—in particular, the same under inter-
ventional and observational conditions. When it holds, we are, intuitively, justified in
identifying Et(Y ) with E∅(Y | T = t) (t = 0, 1), so allowing estimation of ACE from
the available data.
To make this intuition precise, note that, according to Definition 3.2, property (8.1)
implies that there exists w(T ) such that, for all σ ∈ {∅, 0, 1},
Eσ(Y | T ) = w(T ) a.s. [Pσ].
Now in the interventional regimes, for t = 0, 1, Pt(T = t) = 1. Thus for t = 0, 1,
w(t) = Et(Y | T = t) = Et(Y ) a.s. [Pt].
Since both w(t) and Et(Y ) are non-random real numbers, we thus must have
w(t) = Et(Y ). (8.2)
Also, in the observational regime,
E∅(Y | T ) = w(T ) a.s. [P∅].
Thus (so long as in the observational regime both treatments are allocated with pos-
itive probability) we obtain, for t = 0, 1,
E∅(Y | T = t) = w(t)
= Et(Y ) by (8.2).
Then
ACE = E1(Y )− E0(Y )
= E∅(Y | T = 1)− E∅(Y | T = 0)
and so ACE can be estimated from the observational data. ✷
Example 8.2. [Dynamic treatment strategies] Suppose we wish to control some vari-
able of interest through a sequence of consecutive actions [Robins, 1986, 1987, 1989].
An example in a medical context is maintaining a critical variable, such as blood pres-
sure, within an appropriate risk-free range. To achieve such control, the doctor will
administer treatments over a number of stages, taking into account, at each stage, a
record of the patient’s history, which provides information on the level of the critical
variable, and possibly other related measurements.
We consider two sets of stochastic variables: L, a set of observable variables,
and A, a set of action variables. The variables in L represent initial or intermedi-
ate symptoms, reactions, personal information, etc., observable between consecutive
treatments, and over which we have no direct control; they are perceived as generated
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and revealed by Nature. The action variables A represent the treatments, which we
could either control by external intervention, or else leave to Nature (or the doctor)
to determine.
An alternating ordered sequence I := (L1, A1, . . . , Ln, An, Ln+1 ≡ Y ) with Li ⊆ L
and Ai ∈ A defines an information base, the interpretation being that the specified
variables are observed in this time order.Thus at each stage i (= 1, . . . , n) we will have
a realisation of the random variable (or set of random variables) Li ⊆ L, followed by
a value for the variable Ai ∈ A. After the realization of the final An ∈ A, we will
observe the outcome variable Ln+1 ∈ L, which we also denote by Y .
In such a problems we might be interested to evaluate and compare different
strategies, i.e., well-specified algorithms that take as input the recorded history of
a patient at each stage and give as output the choice (possibly randomised) of the
next treatment to be allocated. These strategies constitute interventional regimes, for
which we would like to make inference. However, it may not be possible to implement
all (or any) of these strategies to gather data, so we may need to rely on observational
data and hope that it will be possible to use these data to estimate the interventional
effects of interest.
We thus take the regime space to be S = {∅}∪S∗, where ∅ labels the observational
regime under which data have been gathered, and S∗ is the collection of contemplated
interventional strategies. We denote the regime indicator, taking values in S, by Σ.
In order to identify the effect of some strategy s ∈ S∗ on the outcome variable Y ,
we aim to estimate, from the observational data gathered under regime Σ = ∅, the
expectation Es{k(Y )}, for some appropriate function k(·) of Y , that would result from
application of strategy s.
One way to compute Es{k(Y )} is by identifying the overall joint density of
(L1, A1, . . . , Ln, An, Y ) in the interventional regime of interest s. Factorising this joint
density, we have:
ps(y, l, a) =
{
n+1∏
i=1
ps(li | li−1, ai−1)
}
×
{
n∏
i=1
ps(ai | li, ai−1)
}
with ln+1 ≡ y. Here li denotes (l1, . . . , li), etc.
In order to compute Es{k(Y )}, we thus need the following terms:
(i) ps(ai | li, ai−1) for i = 1, . . . , n.
(ii) ps(li | li−1, ai−1) for i = 1, . . . , n+ 1.
Since s is an interventional regime, corresponding to a well-defined treatment
strategy, the terms in (i) are fully specified by the treatment protocol. So we only
need to get a handle on the terms in (ii).
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One assumption that would allow this is simple stability, expressed as
Li ⊥⊥ Σ | (Li−1, Ai−1) (i = 1, . . . , n+ 1).
This says, intuitively, that the distribution of Li, given all past observations, is the
same in both the interventional and the observational regimes. When it holds (and
assuming that the conditioning event occurs with positive probability in the observa-
tional regime) we can replace ps(li | li−1, ai−1) in (ii) with its observationally estimable
counterpart, p∅(li | li−1, ai−1). We then have all the ingredients needed to estimate
the interventional effect Es{k(Y )}.3
However, in many cases the presence of unmeasured variables, both influencing
the actions taken under the observational regime and affecting their outcomes, would
not support a direct assumption of simple stability. Denote these additional variables
by Ui (i = 1, . . . , n). A condition that might be more justifiable in this context is
extended stability, expressed as
(Li, Ui) ⊥⊥ Σ | (Li−1, U i−1Ai−1) (i = 1, . . . , n+ 1).
This is like simple stability, but taking the unmeasured variables also into account.
Now extended stability does not, in general, imply simple stability. But using the
machinery of extended conditional independence, we can explore when, in combination
with further conditions that might also be justifiable—for example, sequential ran-
domisation or sequential irrelevance [Dawid and Didelez, 2010, Dawid and Constantinou,
2014]—simple stability can still be deduced, and hence Es{k(Y )} estimated. ✷
9 Discussion
We have presented a rigorous account of the hitherto informal concept of extended
conditional independence, and indicated its fruitfulness in numerous statistical con-
texts, such as ancillarity, sufficiency, causal inference,etc.
Graphical models, in the form of Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), are often used
to represent collections of conditional independence properties amongst stochastic
variables [Lauritzen et al., 1990, Cowell et al., 2007], and we can then use graphical
techniques (in particular, the d-separation, or the equivalent moralization, criterion)
to derive, in a visual and transparent way, implied conditional independence properties
that follow from the assumptions. When such graphical models are extended to
Influence Diagrams, incorporating both stochastic and non-stochastic variables, the
identical methods support causal inference [Dawid, 2002]. Numerous application may
be found in Dawid [2015]. The theory developed in this paper formally justifies this
extended methodology.
3The actual computation can be streamlined using G-recursion [Dawid and Didelez, 2010].
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.2.
(i) to (ii): By definition σ(Z) = {Z−1(A) : A ∈ FZ}. Observe that for all z ∈ FZ
and all B ∈ σ(Z), either {ω ∈ Ω : Z(ω) = z} ∩ B = ∅ or {ω ∈ Ω : Z(ω) = z} ⊆ B.
Now fix z ∈ FZ . Since Z is surjective, {ω ∈ Ω : Z(ω) = z} 6= ∅. Observing that
∪y∈FY {ω ∈ Ω : Y (ω) = y} = Ω we can find y ∈ FY such that {ω ∈ Ω : Z(ω) =
z} ∩ {ω ∈ Ω : Y (ω) = y} 6= ∅. But {ω ∈ Ω : Y (ω) = y} ∈ σ(Y ) ⊆ σ(Z). Therefore
{ω ∈ Ω : Z(ω) = z} ⊆ {ω ∈ Ω : Y (ω) = y} and this y ∈ FY is unique. For all such
z ∈ FZ define f(z) = y. We have therefore constructed f : FZ → FY where f(Z) = Y .
To show that f is FZ-measurable, consider EY ∈ FY . Then
f−1(EY ) = {z ∈ FZ : f(z) = y ∈ EY }
= {z = Z(ω) ∈ FZ : f(Z(ω)) = Y (ω) = y ∈ EY }
= Z({ω ∈ Ω : Y (ω) = y ∈ EY }).
Since EY ∈ FY , {ω ∈ Ω : Y (ω) = y ∈ EY } ∈ σ(Y ) ⊆ σ(Z). Thus there exists
EZ ∈ FZ such that Z({ω ∈ Ω : Y (ω) ∈ EY }) = EZ and we have proved that f is
FZ-measurable.
(ii) to (i): Let A ∈ σ(Y ) = {Y −1(B) : B ∈ FY }. Then there exists B ∈ FY such that
Y −1(B) = A, which implies that (f ◦Z)−1(B) = A and thus Z−1(f−1(B)) = A. Since
B ∈ FY and f is FZ-measurable, f−1(B) ∈ FZ . Also since f−1(B) ∈ FZ and Z is
σ(Z)-measurable, Z−1(f−1(B)) ∈ σ(Z), which concludes the proof. ✷
Proof of Proposition 2.3.
(i)⇒ (ii): We will prove (ii) using the monotone class theorem [Durrett, 2013, p. 235].
Consider
V = {f real, bounded and measurable : E {f(X) | Y, Z} = E {f(X) | Z} a.s. } .
By linearity of expectation V is a vector space of real and bounded functions. Now by
(i) 1AX ∈ V for all AX ∈ σ(X). Let fn(X) ∈ V for all n ∈ N such that 0 ≤ fn(X) ↑
f(X), where f(X) is bounded. Using conditional monotone convergence [Durrett,
2013, p. 193],
E {f(X) | Y, Z} = lim
n→∞
E {fn(X) | Y, Z}
= lim
n→∞
E {fn(X) | Z} since fn(X) ∈ V
= E {f(X) | Z} .
Thus f(X) ∈ V and we have shown (ii).
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(ii) ⇒ (iii): Let f(X), g(Y ) be real, bounded and measurable functions. Then
E {f(X)g(Y ) | Z} = E [E {f(X)g(Y ) | Z, Y } | Z] a.s.
= E [g(Y )E {f(X) | Z, Y } | Z] a.s.
= E [g(Y )E {f(X) | Z} | Z] a.s. by (ii)
= E {f(X) | Z}E {g(Y ) | Z} a.s.
(iii) ⇒ (iv): Let AX ∈ σ(X) and AY ∈ σ(Y ). Then 1AX is a real, bounded and
σ(X)-measurable function and 1AY is a real, bounded and σ(Y )-measurable function.
Thus (iv) is a special case of (iii).
(iv) ⇒ (i): Let AX ∈ σ(X) and w(Z) be a version of E (1AX | Z). Then w(Z) is
σ(Z)-measurable and so, since σ(Z) ⊆ σ(Y, Z), also σ(Y, Z)-measurable. To show
that E (1AX1A) = E {w(Z)1A } whenever A ∈ σ(Y, Z), let
DAX = {A ∈ σ(Y, Z) : E (1AX1A) = E {w(Z)1A} }
and
Π = {A ∈ σ(Y, Z) : A = AX ∩AY for some AY ∈ σ(Y ), AZ ∈ σ(Z)}.
Then σ(Π) = σ(Y, Z) [Resnick, 2014, p. 73]. We will show that DAX is a d-system
that contains Π and apply Dynkin’s lemma [Billingsley, 1995, p. 42] to conclude that
DAX contains σ(Π) = σ(Y, Z).
To show that DAX contains Π, let AY,Z = AY ∩AZ with AY ∈ σ(Y ) and AZ ∈ σ(Z).
Then
E (1AX1A) = E{E (1AX1AY ∩AZ | Z)}
= E {1AZE (1AX1AY | Z)}
= E {1AZE(1AX | Z)E(1AY | Z)} by (i)
= E [E {E(1AX | Z)1AY ∩AZ | Z}]
= E {E(1AX | Z)1A} .
To show that DAX is a d-system, first note that Ω ∈ DAX . Also, for A1, A2 ∈ DAX
such that A1 ⊆ A2,
E
(
1AX1A2\A1
)
= E (1AX1A2)− E (1AX1A1)
= E {w(Z)1A2} − E {w(Z)1A1} since A1, A2 ∈ DAX
= E
{
w(Z)1A2\A1
}
.
Now consider (An : n ∈ N), an increasing sequence in DAX . Then An ↑ ∪kAk
and 1AX1An ↑ 1AX1∪kAk pointwise. Thus by monotone convergence E (1AX1An) ↑
E
(
1AX1∪kAk
)
. Also w(Z)1An ↑ w(Z)1∪kAk pointwise. Thus by monotone conver-
gence, E {w(Z)1An} ↑ E
{
w(Z)1∪kAk
}
.
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We can now see that:
E
(
1AX1∪nAn
)
= lim
n
E (1AX1An)
= lim
n
E {w(Z)1An}
= E
{
w(Z)1∪nAn
}
.
✷
Proof of Proposition 2.5.
(i) ⇒ (ii): It readily follows from (i) since R(X | y, z) = R(X|z) which is a function
of z only.
(ii) ⇒ (i): Let a(Z) := R(X | Y, Z) and let (y, z) ∈ R(Y, Z). Then
R(X | z) = {X(σ) : σ ∈ S, Z(σ) = z}
=
⋃
y′∈R(Y |z)
{X(σ) : σ ∈ S, (Y, Z)(σ) = (y′, z)}
=
⋃
y′∈R(Y |z)
R(X | y′, z)
=
⋃
y′∈R(Y |z)
a(z)
= a(z)
= R(X | y, z).
(i) ⇒ (iii): Let z ∈ R(Z). Then
R(X, Y | z) = {(X, Y )(σ) : σ ∈ S, Z(σ) = z}
=
⋃
y∈R(Y |z)
⋃
x∈R(X|y,z)
{(x, y)}
=
⋃
y∈R(Y |z)
⋃
x∈R(X|z)
{(x, y)} by (i)
= R(X | z)×R(Y | z).
(iii) ⇒ (i): Let (y, z) ∈ R(Y, Z). Then
R(X | y, z) = {x : x ∈ R(X | y, z)}
= {x : (x, y) ∈ R(X, Y | z)}
= {x : (x, y) ∈ R(X | z)×R(Y | z)} by (iii)
= {x : x ∈ R(X | z), y ∈ R(Y | z)}
= {x : x ∈ R(X | z)}
= R(X | z).
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✷Proof of Proposition 2.6.
(i) to (ii): For y ∈ Y (S), take σy ∈ Y −1({y}). Define f : Y (S) → W (S) by f(y) =
W (σy). To check that f(Y ) = W , let σ ∈ S and y = Y (σ). Then f(Y (σ)) =
f(y) = W (σy). By (i) (since Y (σ) = Y (σy) = y), we get that W (σy) = W (σ). Thus
f(Y (σ)) = W (σ) for all σ ∈ S.
(ii) to (i): Follows from the definition of . ✷
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
(i) ⇒ (ii). Let φ ∈ Φ(S) and let h1 be a real, bounded and measurable function.
Then for σ ∈ Φ−1(φ) and h2 a real bounded and measurable function, we have:
Eσ {h1(X)h2(Y ) | Z} = Eσ [Eσ {h1(X)h2(Y ) | Y, Z} | Z] a.s. [Pσ]
= Eσ [h2(Y )Eσ {h1(X) | Y, Z} | Z] a.s. [Pσ]
= Eσ{h2(Y )wφ(Z) | Z} a.s. [Pσ] by (i)
= wφ(Z)Eσ {h2(Y ) | Z} a.s. [Pσ].
(ii)⇒ (iii). Follows directly on taking h1(X) = 1AX , h2(Y ) = 1AY .
(iii)⇒ (iv). Let φ ∈ Φ(S) and AX ∈ σ(X) and consider wφ(Z) as in (iii). Note
that (3.2) is equivalent to: for all σ ∈ Φ−1(φ),
Eσ
(
1AX1AY,Z
)
= Eσ
{
wφ(Z)1AY,Z
}
whenever AY,Z ∈ σ(Y, Z). (A.1)
To show (A.1), consider
DAX =
{
AY,Z ∈ σ(Y, Z) : Eσ
(
1AX1AY,Z
)
= Eσ{wφ(Z)1AY,Z}
}
and
Π = {AY,Z ∈ σ(Y, Z) : AY,Z = AX ∩AY for some AY ∈ σ(Y ), AZ ∈ σ(Z)}.
Then σ(Π) = σ(Y, Z) [Resnick, 2014, p. 73]. We will show that DAX is a d-system
that contains Π; it will then follow from Dynkin’s lemma [Billingsley, 1995, p. 42]
that DAX contains σ(Π) = σ(Y, Z) and hence that (A.1) holds.
To show that DAX contains Π, take AY ∈ σ(Y ) and AZ ∈ σ(Z), and let AY,Z =
AY ∩ AZ . Then
Eσ
(
1AX1AY,Z
)
= Eσ {Eσ (1AX1AY ∩AZ | Z)}
= Eσ {1AZEσ (1AX1AY | Z)}
= Eσ {1AZwφ(Z)Eσ(1AY | Z)} by (iii)
= Eσ [Eσ {wφ(Z)1AY ∩AZ | Z}]
= Eσ
{
wφ(Z)1AY,Z
}
.
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To show that DAX is a d-system, first note that Ω ∈ DAX . Also, for A1, A2 ∈ DAX
such that A1 ⊆ A2, we have:
Eσ
(
1AX1A2\A1
)
= Eσ (1AX1A2)− Eσ (1AX1A1)
= Eσ {wφ(Z)1A2} − Eσ {wφ(Z)1A1} since A1, A2 ∈ DAX
= Eσ
{
wφ(Z)1A2\A1
}
.
Now consider an increasing sequence (An : n ∈ N) in DAX . Then An ↑ ∪kAk and
1AX1An ↑ 1AX1∪kAk pointwise. Thus by monotone convergence Eσ(1AX1An) ↑
Eσ(1AX1∪kAk). Also wφ(Z)1An ↑ wφ(Z)1∪kAk pointwise, and thus by monotone
convergence Eσ{wφ(Z)1An} ↑ Eσ{wφ(Z)1∪kAk}. We can now see that
Eσ
(
1AX1∪nAn
)
= lim
n
Eσ (1AX1An)
= lim
n
Eσ {wφ(Z)1An} since An ∈ DAX
= Eσ
{
wφ(Z)1∪nAn
}
.
(iv)⇒ (i). We will prove (iv) using the monotone class theorem [Durrett, 2013, p. 235].
Let φ ∈ Φ(S) and consider
V := {h real, bounded and measurable: there exists wφ(Z) such that, for all σ ∈ Φ
−1(φ),
Eσ{h(X) | Y, Z} = wφ(Z) a.s. [Pσ]}.
By linearity of expectation, V is a vector space of real and bounded functions, and by
(iv) 1AX ∈ V for all AX ∈ σ(X). Now let hn ∈ V for all n ∈ N such that 0 ≤ hn ↑ h
with h bounded. Using conditional monotone convergence [Durrett, 2013, p. 193],
Eσ {h(X) | Y, Z} = lim
n→∞
Eσ {hn(X) | Y, Z}
= lim
n→∞
wnφ(Z) since hn ∈ V
=: wφ(Z)
which proves that h ∈ V . By the monotone class theorem [Durrett, 2013, p. 235], V
contains every bounded measurable function, and thus we have shown (i). ✷
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